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The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The
Malaise Grows
After September 11th 2001, the Chinese regime strove to include its
repression of Uyghur opposition within the international dynamic of the
struggle against Islamic terrorist networks.
Rémi Castets
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 Over  the  past  twenty  years,  the  unrest  in  Xinjiang  has  intensified  and  Uyghur
nationalist feeling has strengthened. This study aims to throw light on the causes of the
current rise of Uyghur nationalism and the forms it has taken. We shall draw attention
to the determining effect of a socio-political context driven by colonial logics in order
to explain how the nationalist ideology has been reinforced, with its aim of restoring to
the Uyghurs—or more generally  to  the Turkic-speaking population of  Xinjiang—the
reins of  political  power within a truly autonomous or even independent entity.  We
shall also underline the impact of recent changes within the political context of China
and Central Asia1.
A turbulent historical and political context
2 Xinjiang (East Turkistan2), which was annexed by China in the mid-eighteenth century,
is mainly populated by Turkic-speaking3 Muslims4, the majority of whom are Uyghurs5
(see Table 1). Despite a long tradition of exchanges with China, these people are linked,
primarily by ties of culture and religion, to the Central Asian world. Probably this is one
reason why, though they are becoming increasingly integrated with China, they have
never very willingly accepted the idea of sharing a common destiny with the Chinese
people. However, looking beyond questions of culture, other factors at different times
have contributed to weakening Chinese sovereignty over this region. Thus, during the
first half of the twentieth century, driven by the local elite in contact with Turkey and
The Uyghurs in Xinjiang – The Malaise Grows
China Perspectives, 49 | september-october 2003
1
with  the  Tatars  of  Russia,  Pan-Turkist  reformism6 put  down  the  first  ideological
markers of what were to become Xinjiang’s anti-colonial movements7. At a time when
Chinese power at the centre was weakening and the great powers (such as Britain and
Russia)  were  attempting  to  exploit  the  various  political  factions  to  build  up  their
influence,  two  independent  republics  were  founded  in  Xinjiang.  The  Turk  Islamic
Republic  of  East  Turkistan  (TIRET)  was  led  by  the  emirs  of  Khotan  and  by  anti-
communist Pan-Turkists and was centred on the region of Khotan and Kashgar (1933
and 1934)8. And then, between 1944 and 1949, the East Turkistan Republic (ETR) was
supported by the Soviets and based in the three northern districts of Xinjiang along the
frontier with the USSR9.
3 From 1949 onwards, the re-emergence of a new and strong centralised power enabled
China to reassert sovereignty over the region. The communist regime then introduced
a nationalities policy modelled on the Soviet pattern: 55 national minorities (shaoshu
minzu), together with the Han, make up the Chinese nation. Ever since, for the first time
in  China,  this  policy  has  guaranteed  the  recognition  of  the  linguistic  and  cultural
identities of the national minorities, while granting them certain advantages, helping
them to integrate within the new system10.
4 At the same time, once the opposition of Pan-Turkist separatists and the last of the
underground rebels had been eradicated, the province of Xinjiang was transformed, in
1955, into an autonomous region. But this autonomy was in reality only symbolic, and
contrasted sharply with the real political autonomy that many had been hoping for.
Indeed,  the  region’s  political  system  remains  under  the  control  of  the  Communist
Party,  itself  dominated  by  the  original  Han  population  of  China’s  interior.  The
shortcomings  of  this  system  built  up  a  powerful  sense  of  frustration,  preventing
Uyghur society from realising many of  its  aspirations and from challenging certain
policies it had overwhelmingly rejected; of these, undoubtedly the most unpopular was
the colonisation of the region.
5 From the 1950s onwards,  the communist  regime encouraged the settlement of  Han
population centres in order to secure, control and exploit the region, which is rich in
hydrocarbons, mineral resources and virgin agricultural land11. Since 1949, the region
has seen a massive inflow of Han immigrants mainly directed there by the Xinjiang
Production  and  Construction  Corps  (XPCC)  (Xinjiang  shengchan  jianche  bingtuan).
Originally, this organisation had helped former soldiers demobilised after the Civil War
to settle down, by providing some advantages to its members. These corps of “peasant-
soldiers” sent to the margins of the country to open up new pioneer areas did not
survive the Cultural Revolution, except in Xinjiang where they were revitalised during
the 1980s in order to pursue demographic colonisation while boosting the manpower
needed  to  provide  security  for  the  region.  Subsidised  up  to  80%  by  the  central
government, the XPCCs today control nearly one-third of the local farmed land and
produce about a quarter of the provincial industrial  output12.  During the 1950s,  the
XPCCs had about a hundred thousand members;  today their numbers are above 2.4
million,  of  whom  90%  are  Han  (that  is,  one-third  of  the  Han  living  “officially”  in
Xinjiang13). Thanks to the XPCCs, and also to migratory inflows not directly controlled
by the state, the Han population has risen from 6.7% of the region’s population in 1949
to about  40% today,  that  is,  more than seven million out  of  a  total  of  18.5  million
inhabitants (see Table 1). But colonisation has not stabilised the region—far from it. Its
socio-economic  repercussions,  together  with  Peking’s  domineering attitude towards
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the regional political  system, have generated a malaise that has lent new vigour in
recent years to Uyghur nationalism and separatism.
6 This  phenomenon has  been catalysed at  the  same time by  changes  in  the  political
context of the region. Indeed, the victory of the Afghan mujaheddin over the Red Army
and,  with the break-up of  the Soviet  Union,  the independence of  the central  Asian
republics have galvanised Uyghur separatism. Many of the militants have seen in the
emergence of national states as homelands for the other large Turkic populations of
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan . . .), the justification
of  their  own aspirations  to  independence.  Moreover,  by reason of  the cultural  and
religious ties that the Uyghurs share with the rest of Central Asia, these events have
given  them  hopes  of  drawing  new  support  from  beyond  their  own  borders.  This
potentiality for destabilisation, the concomitant swell of unrest in Xinjiang and the rise
of Islamism14 in Central Asia during the 1990s have led Peking to react.
7 China, torn between the necessity for opening its frontiers to economic inflows and the
wish to isolate Uyghur opposition from any exterior support or “subversive” influence,
has  combined  its  policy  of  speeding  up  the  region’s  economic  development  with
strengthening  its  security  collaboration  with  its  neighbours,  pursuing  demographic
colonisation and stiffening its repression of those political activities that it considers
unlawful.  But,  by  failing  to  take  account  of  either  the  destabilising  impact  of
colonisation on Uyghur society or the demand for self-government among the local
population,  these  policies  could  not  solve  the  real  problems  behind  the  growth  of
unrest. 
The origins of Uyghur malaise: colonisation and socio-economic stratification 
8 Colonisation and its socio-economic consequences are much disliked by the Uyghurs:
they constitute the main grievance among the protest movements. Indeed, colonisation
tends, through a complex process, to exclude Xinjiang’s national minorities from the
benefits of economic advance. In attempting to stabilise the region, the central state
has  made  significant  investments15 that  have  contributed  to  developing  the  local
economy. This region, once among the poorest in China, today, within the provinces of
China’s “Great West”16, now boasts the highest per capita GDP; in these terms it ranks
twelfth among all  China’s  provinces17.  However,  these encouraging macro-economic
figures hide pronounced inequalities that apply along ethnic lines. To Uyghur eyes, the
investments are directed first towards the areas of colonisation18, and have benefited
the Han colonists most of all. Thus, the per capita GDP in Han areas is far higher than
that in areas where the Uyghurs are still in the majority (see Table 2). The low figure
for  GDP  per  head  in  the  Tarim  Basin,  where  three-quarters  of  Xinjiang’s  Uyghur
population is concentrated, makes it likely that a significant number of families have
incomes below the Chinese poverty threshold and even further beneath the threshold
set by the international organisations19. 
9 At the same time,  these  differences  in  income imposed along ethnic  lines  underlie
unequal  access  to  the  educational  system—which,  in  turn,  serves  to  reinforce  the
economic inequalities.  In effect,  the inability of  the poorest  people to finance their
children’s  schooling  perpetuates—even  more  than  linguistic  handicaps20 and  a
sometimes  discriminatory  job-recruitment  system—socio-professional  inequalities
condemning much of the Uyghur population to the lowest rungs of society. 
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The peoples of Xinjiang
10 Theoretically, the Chinese education system is supposed to make it easier for minorities
to climb the social scale, by means of a system of quotas and university scholarships.
However the partial withdrawal of the state from financing the education system has
led to an increase in schooling costs  and falling numbers of  scholarships.  With the
liberalisation  of  the  Chinese  economy,  some  financial  security  is  more  and  more
necessary in order to pursue one’s studies. The poorest families do not have the means
to provide a full education for their children; and they have to restrict their years at
school. While Han families, usually urban and better off, can extend their children’s
education,  and send them to  the  best  establishments,  the  children of  the  minority
communities are unable to complete their secondary education (see Table 3),  which
means they leave school with fewer qualifications (see Table 4). 
11 These differences in educational funding combined with recruitment methods that are
often discriminatory in the private sector21 tend to perpetuate, over a period of several
decades,  socio-professional  stratification:  Uyghurs are penalised in comparison with
the Han. The national minorities in Xinjiang are over-represented at the bottom of the
socio-professional scale and the Han are over-represented at the top. Thus, while the
national  minorities  represented  nearly  54%  of  Xinjiang’s  population  in  1990,  they
accounted for more than 76% of its agricultural workforce (as against 69.4% in 1982
when they were 52.8% of the total population),  less than 41% of those employed in
liberal and technical professions and less than 30% of managers and administrators22. 
12 As the national minorities descend the socio-economic scale in Xinjiang, their living
standards become more precarious because China has almost no social security system
whatever. According to the 1990 census, the infant mortality rate among the national
minorities  in  Xinjiang  was  3.6  times  higher  than  among  the  Han  and  their  life
expectancy was 62.9 years as against 71.4 for the Han. At the same time, unemployment
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among young Uyghurs has led to higher crime rates and drug-taking—though these are
culturally alien to this Muslim society. Poverty, and also the inequalities mentioned
above, give Uyghurs the sense that they are excluded from economic growth to the
benefit  of  the  Han.  The  status  of  “second-rate”  Chinese  citizen  contrasts  with  the
promises of wealth and equality made by the regime at the time of Xinjiang’s “peaceful
liberation”,  and  it  has  led  many  Uyghurs  to  think  that  they  have  been  fooled  by
Peking’s communist pretensions and that, in reality, they are living under the yoke of a
colonial regime. 
Elite expectations and nationalism among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang
13 It  is  suggested,  in  the  debate  over  the  notion  of  internal  colonialism23,  that  under
administrations that are colonial or perceived as such, socio-economic stratification
along  ethnic  lines  around the  peripheries  of  some states  is  likely  to  encourage  an
increasing  sense  of  identity  and  the  rise  of  nationalism.  Even  though  this  kind  of
approach does not explain all the factors and paradigms entering the equation in the
birth  and  the  growing  influence  of  nationalism  in  Xinjiang  since  the  start  of  the
twentieth  century,  it  does  help  us  to  see  how such inequalities  have  favoured  the
strengthening of Uyghur nationalism over the past twenty years. Indeed, going beyond
cultural  identity,  socio-economic and political  stratification in Xinjiang has brought
many Uyghurs  to  view themselves  as  a  lower-grade community,  separate  from the
central community (that is to say, the Han) that dominates the economic and political
systems. To that extent, it has favoured the emergence of anti-colonial nationalism24,
fuelled by the distinctive identity of the Uyghurs to legitimise the establishment of real
self-government (which would at last serve the interests of the Uyghurs—and not those
exclusively of Peking and the Han).
14 The Uyghur elite, more numerous and driven to compete with the Han, have increasing
difficulty in fitting into the system25. It is true that the Chinese regime does attempt to
co-opt  a  proportion  of  the  Uyghurs  into  the  administration  but,  even  though
noteworthy  efforts  have  been  made  since  the  1950s,  it  seems  that  over  these  last
decades they have not been enough to integrate all the new Uyghur elite inside the
system. In the 1950s, because of the small number of Uyghurs who had been educated,
it was relatively easy for them to find posts on a level with their expectations. Over the
past twenty years, with the end of the policy of the “iron rice bowl” (tiefanwan) and the
arrival of greater numbers of well-qualified Uyghurs and, in particular, Han in the job
market, the integration of some elite Uyghurs has become more problematical. Thus,
many young Uyghurs of working-class or middle-class origins reproach the Chinese
regime  for  not  providing  them  with  job  opportunities  commensurate  with  their
training and, instead, for favouring the appointment of Han to management posts26.
15 The small amount of data relating to the ethnic origins of some of the Xinjiang elite
appears  to  support  such contentions.  For  example,  in  1990,  the national  minorities
provided only 28.8% of the total number of managers and administrators in Xinjiang27.
This state of affairs is also observable within the political system: officials drawn from
the national minorities are still under-represented in the Xinjiang Communist Party.
They accounted for only 37.3% of its members in 199728. Moreover, bearing in mind that
their loyalty towards Peking is considered suspect, they are often held down in posts
with  little  power  or  posts  where  they  can  easily  be  controlled.  Admittedly,  the
Presidents of the People’s Government of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, of
each Autonomous Prefecture and of each Autonomous Village are elected on the basis
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of  the  titular  nationality  of  the  autonomous  administrative  entity.  However,  as
everywhere else in China, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the controlling force
behind political institutions. And the most important CCP posts in Xinjiang are held by
Han loyal  to  Peking and not  by members of  national  minorities.  For  example,  it  is
revealing to note that, ever since 1949, the post of Secretary of the CCP in the Xinjiang
Uyghur Autonomous Region has been occupied in an almost systematic way by Han
Chinese.
16 In sum, while a proportion of the Uyghur elite is integrated, even very well integrated,
and has been for several generations, a growing number of the new elite find increasing
difficulty  in  fulfilling  their  expectations  and  feel  resentful  of  being  excluded,  even
colonised. Shifting this fault line, where the integration of Uyghur elites is concerned,
acts as a kind of measuring instrument for Uyghur nationalism. If the indicator moves
towards “fewer well-integrated elite”, the nationalist opposition is likely to show itself
more  structured  and  more  vigorous.  Today,  the  fact  that  poorly  integrated  elite
Uyghurs are more numerous than before explains the rising discontent among young
educated people and the strengthening of their political opposition. Yet, the fact that a
proportion of them continues to be “well integrated” harms the structure of Uyghur
nationalism by preventing for the present the large-scale recruitment of officials likely
to organise mass movements.
Reassertion of identity and Islamic revival among the Uyghurs of Xinjiang
17 Ever since the dark days of  the Cultural  Revolution,  the relative openness that has
followed Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power has left the way open to a vast movement for
revitalising  local  culture.  The  1980s  saw  a  return  towards  the  traditions  and  the
“imagined  foundations”  of  Uyghur  identity.  This  phenomenon  in  its  many  forms
manifests itself, for example, in the proliferation of books and academic research into
Uyghur history and culture. It has also taken the form, as among the Hui, of an Islamic
revival29. While publications relating to Islam flourished, mosques were renovated and
many new ones built. Similarly, religious education developed strongly: Koranic schools
were opened, attached to mosques on the one hand or, on the other, as private schools
—usually  undeclared30.  This  Islamic  revival,  observed  right  across  China,  has
nevertheless assumed a distinctive dimension among the Uyghurs. For them it is part
of  a  logic  of  return  (or  perceived  return)  to  practices  formerly  discouraged  or
repressed, but it is also at the margin part of a more militant logic using Islam as an
instrument  for  distinguishing  Uyghur  values31 from  the  non-clerical  and  atheistic
values promoted by the Chinese authorities. 
 
Table 1 : Demographic strength of the main Xinjiang nationalities
Source: Fenjin de sishi nian: 1949-1989. Xinjiang fenci (The advancing 40 years. 1949-1989. Xinjiang
Volume), Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, Urumchi, 1989, p. 332; 2002 Xinjiang tongji nianjian (Xinjiang
Statistical Yearbook), Pékin, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 2002, pp. 107, 109.
18 The revival of the Uyghurs’ Islamic culture and identity has also led, during the 1980s,
to the formation of student associations aiming to promote the rights and culture of
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the  Uyghurs:  the  Tengritakh  Association  (Tianshan),  the  Youth  Association  of  East
Turkistan, the Students’ Cultural and Scientific Association32… Some of these student
associations, which reflect the growing strength of the democratic student movement
in  China  and  challenge  “Great  Han  chauvinism”,  seem  quickly  to  have  adopted  a
militant style. This is conveyed in a report reflecting CCP anxiety:
19 In the thirty years between 1949 and 1979, almost no demonstration was held by the
Xinjiang minority students in Xinjiang, but after 1980, student demonstrations have
broke out one after another. This is a new phenomena. Uyghur students from seven
universities  and colleges  including  Xinjiang  University  in  Urumqi  demonstrated  on
December 12th 1985. They were openly against the Central Government's decision. [. . .]
 Some of the students from Xinjiang University got together and organized this well
planned and well organized political incident for which the Xinjiang University became
the headquarter. Before and after that incident, some pro-separatism posters and flyers
with contents such as: “Chinese out of Xinjiang”, “Independence for Xinjiang”, “Cut off
the  railroad from China proper to  Xinjiang”  were  discovered in  Urumqi  and other
districts. In June 1986, another demonstration was organized by a student association
in Xinjiang University. [. . .] Using the “support for the minority education” as a cover,
they attacked Central Communist Party's minority autonomy policy, damaged the good
relationship  among  the  nationalities.  They  used  slogans  such  as  “No  big  Chinese
Nationalism”, “No Chinese population transfer to Xinjiang”, and created a very bad
influence in the society.33    
20 Outside  the  campuses,  the  revival  of  the  meshrep34 expresses  the  wish  to  revitalise
Uyghur culture and identity. At the start of the 1990s, young Uyghurs of the region of
Ghulja (Yining) launched a movement to re-invigorate these gatherings which have
spread  rapidly.  However,  the  movement  has  also  taken,  according  to  the  Chinese
authorities, a “counter-revolutionary” turn. Fearing that it might become a focus for
protest and “local nationalism” (difang minzuzhuyi), the regional government banned
the  meshrep in  1995;  and  the  people  who  had  launched  the  movement  were
imprisoned35.
The rise and fall of two clandestine political movements of some stature
21 This aspiration to greater militancy36 has also taken the form of clandestine political
movements37 that,  in  Xinjiang  and  in  the  Diaspora 38,  are  founded  on  Uyghur
nationalism tinged with Pan-Turkism39.  Admittedly, these movements are not “mass
movements”—and even less so in the present climate of repression. Uyghur militancy is
driven mostly by a fringe group of young students and intellectuals, purged regularly
by Chinese repression. Up until  the 1990s,  two successive clandestine groups in the
tradition  of  the  pre-1949  oppositional  currents,  both  quite  durable,  dominated  the
underground political scene. Of these two nationalist Pan-Turkist parties, one, socialist
and secular, relied on Soviet aid, and the other came from the anti-communist and
Islamic  tradition  centred  on  the  south  of  Xinjiang.  Both  could  call  upon a  base  of
militancy that was relatively wide compared with present-day groupings (see below).
At  the  same  time  they  were  counting  on  significant  underground  mobilisation  to
prepare for a general uprising in Xinjiang.
22 After 1949, the first big organised clandestine party was formed under the name of the
Eastern Turkistan People’s Party (ETPP) (Sharki Turkistan Halk Partisi). Mainly drawing
in  Uyghurs  but  also  Kazakhs,  it  was  founded  in  secret,  according  to  the  Chinese
authorities,  in  February  1968;  but,  according  to  the  militants  who have  now taken
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refuge abroad, some of its cells had already been active for several years beforehand40.
This was a separatist Pan-Turkist party with Marxist allegiances. Well-structured and
hierarchic, it swiftly recruited former officials of the East Turkistan Republic as well as
young  people  from  Turkic-speaking  minorities.  According  to  the  East  Turkistan
National Centre, this party numbered more than 60,000 members and 178 branches in
Xinjiang41. These figures are hard to verify. However, the ETPP is probably the largest
secret organisation ever created since the liberation of Xinjiang. The rise to power of
this underground party seems to have been favoured mainly by the excesses of the
Cultural Revolution and by the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations. Indeed, the USSR
did give help to the ETPP. As is confirmed by Chinese sources and the testimony of
some of its former militants, the KGB developed its links with this party mostly through
its agents active in Kazakhstan and seems to have provided it with logistical support on
several occasions:
23 The ETPP's Central Committee and subcommittee drafted articles such as “The Destiny
of  the  Uyghurs”,  “Eastern  Turkestan  People's  Party's  Constitution”  and  “Eastern
Turkestan People's Party's General Principles”. [.  .  .]   they all claim [. .  .]  “Seize the
power  with  the  help  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  establish  an  independent  Eastern
Turkestan  Republic”  [.  .  .].  Some of  them  even  held  the  banner  of  Marxism  and
Leninism and proposed: “We want to establishing an independent country according to
the Marxist  principle  of  self-determination of  different  peoples”.  [.  .  .]  On a  dozen
occasions, the “ETPP”'s Ili Committee, Urumqi Branch, and Altay Bureau also sent their
delegations to Soviet Union and Mongolia Republic to beg for arms and the use of radio
stations for their riots and ask for military advisors. The Soviet Spy agency sent a group
of fourteen people with spies carrying radio transmitters, weapons and funds for their
activities. These groups arrived in Xinjiang and established communication with the
“ETPP” nine times.42
 
Table 2 : Distribution of wealth in the main sub-regional administrative units in Xinjiang
Source: 2002 Xinjiang tongji nianjian, op. cit., pp. 106, 110-115, 713, 715; 2002 Zhongguo tongji
nianjian, op. cit., p. 51.
24 The ETPP focused its activity on mobilising Turkic-speaking populations and officials in
Xinjiang with the aim of preparing a mass insurrection against Peking. At the same
time,  it  took  up  guerrilla  activities  (sabotage,  skirmishes  with  the  police  and  the
Chinese army…) and was behind various attempts at insurrection during the 1960s and
the 1970s. Still quite active during the 1970s, it was gradually weakened by the arrest of
its  leaders,  by  the  gradual  falling  away  of  Soviet  support  as  the  tension  between
Moscow  and  Peking  relaxed,  and  then  by  the  decline  of  the  communist  ideology.
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Nevertheless, while the ETPP was in decline, a new party of anti-Marxist opposition was
developing in southern Xinjiang.
25 As the Soviet Union lost its appeal among anti-colonialist Muslims to the benefit of
revolutionary Islam, and as the revival of Islamism was gathering pace in Xinjiang, the
Islamic Pan-Turkic trend centred on the south of Xinjiang was given renewed vigour by
new young leaders. It was re-organised around the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP)
(Sharki  Turkistan  Islam  Partisi).  This  Pan-Turkic  nationalist  movement  also  aimed  at
renewing  Islam  among  the  Uyghurs  and  developed  from  networks  of  mosques  in
southern  Xinjiang  during  the  1980s.  According  to  official  sources,  it  apparently
generated offshoots  in  numerous cities  in  the Tarim Basin,  indeed as  far  as  Ghulja
(Yining), Turfan and Urumqi43. Probably also inspired by the Afghans’ success against
the Soviets,  it  really  came into prominence in  April  1990 at  the time of  the Baren
insurrection (near Kashgar). The rising took the form of a jihad recalling that which led
to the creation of the Turk Islamic Republic of East Turkistan (1933-1934)44. 
26 The insurrection, which lasted for several days, caused several dozen deaths on the
insurgents’ side and forced the Chinese army to deploy significant forces in the region
to put down the rebellion. The Chinese authorities view the ETIP as part of the Jihadist
current on the other side of the Pamirs; and they consider that it gave birth to more
“radical”  groupings  such  as  the  Party  of  Allah  and  the  Islamic  Movement  of  East
Turkistan. Because of the little information available about this organisation, such links
are  difficult  to  check  and  to  determine  as  true  or  false.  However,  the  slogans
proclaimed during  the  insurrection  suggest  that  the  ETIP  at  this  time was  more  a
renovated  form of  the  Islamic  Pan-Turkism historically  established in  the  south of
Xinjiang than a pure reincarnation of radical Islam: 
27 He [Yusuf  Zeydin,  leader  of  the local  branch of  the ETIP]  and his  followers  openly
shouted: “Down with the socialism!”, “In the past Marxism suppressed religion, and
now it is religion's turn to suppress Marxism”, “Unite all the Turk peoples, long live the
great Eastern Turkistan!”, “Take Barin, establish Eastern Turkistan”.45
28 The subsequent repression prevented the party from being reconstituted on such wide
foundations, despite attempts at this of some of its members in the early 1990s.
The 1990s: the turn towards repression
29 Whereas the 1980s are perceived by many Uyghurs as a period of reduced tension, even
of an improvement in the relations between Uyghur society and the Chinese state, the
1990s saw the emergence of a repressive climate that engendered powerful frustrations
and resentment. The 1990s increase in repression is generally linked with exacerbated
Party anxieties on several levels.
30 Nationally, the conservative wing of the CCP considered that the worst was avoided
after the Tiananmen events in 1989, whereas similar events took place in consequence
on campuses in Xinjiang (see above). It considers that an authoritarian crackdown is
essential to ensure the survival of the regime. At the same time, at the start of the
1990s,  the Chinese regime feared that the accession to independence of the Central
Asian Republics, and also the spread of radical Islam in the region (see below), would
seriously destabilise Xinjiang if nothing was done. On the one hand, the accession to
independence of other large Turkic populations of Central Asia was likely to legitimise
and  strengthen  Uyghur  separatism.  On  the  other,  the  cultural  links  that  bind  the
Uyghurs together with the peoples of the new Republics,  and also with the Uyghur
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Diaspora in these countries46,  allowed Peking to fear that  solidarity would build up
between the Uyghur separatists and these states (or certain organisations present on
their  soil).  Firstly,  some  of  them  (Kazakhstan  and  Kirghizstan  in  particular)  have
effectively offered asylum to the new refugees, and even recognised organisations of
the local Diaspora defending the independence of East Turkistan. Peking then applied
itself  to  cutting  off  the  militants  active  in  Xinjiang  from  these  potential  supports
outside. By playing on the prospects for settling frontier disputes and for economic co-
operation,  and  by  promoting  co-operation  in  the  struggle  against  separatism  and
Islamism  in  Central  Asia  through  the  Shanghai  Co-operation  Organisation  (SCO)47,
China persuaded the Central Asian republics to ban the Uyghur organisations present
on their  territories,  and even today to  extradite  some militants  who have recently
taken refuge there48.
31 On  the  domestic  front,  the  Chinese  regime  confronted  by  the  rise  of  Uyghur
nationalism and by Islamic anti-governmental subversion has progressively tightened
its control over society and the spaces for expressing identity and religion49 to prevent
the start of dynamics that might have made the situation uncontrollable. At the same
time  as  relations  between  the  Chinese  state  and  Uyghur  society  were  becoming
strained and disturbances, sometimes violent, were on the rise (the Baren insurrection
in 1990, the disturbances of the summer and autumn of 1993 over the whole province,
and the riots of July 7th 1995 in Khotan), the Chinese regime’s grip was progressively
tightened.
 
Table 3 : National minorities’ share in Xinjiang’s total school population in 2000
Source: 2002 Xinjiang tongji nianjian, op. cit., pp. 612-613.
32 The turning point really came in 1996-1997, following the launch in April 1996 of the
great  national  campaign  against  crime  “Strike  hard”.  This  campaign  began shortly
after a special meeting in March 1996 on maintaining stability in Xinjiang, and so there
it  assumed  a  special  dimension,  being  targeted  at  separatism and  illegal  religious
activities.  The  Permanent  Committee  of  the  Politburo  of  the  CCP  then  issued  an
exhaustive  list  of  strict  directives  aimed  at  tightening  control  over  Xinjiang  and
eradicating  potentially  subversive  activities50.  As  part  of  the  same  campaign,  a
succession  of  strong-arm  police  operations  was  mounted  (the  special  100-day
crackdown from January to March 1999,  the “General  Campaign against Terrorism”
from April to June 1999, the new campaign “Strike hard” from April 2001 onwards, the
drive against separatism in October 2001…). This intense campaign of repression led to
thousands of arrests and also to constant human rights violations and the improper use
of  the  death  penalty51.  By  fencing  off,  even  closing  down,  the  last  spaces  for  the
expression of identity or religion52,  these restrictions put relations between Uyghur
society and the Chinese regime under considerable strain. They gave the impression
that the real target of the Chinese regime’s attacks was not so much separatism or even
Islamism but Uyghur identity itself53. 
More disturbances and more radicalisation during the 1990s
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33 During  the  same  period,  the  introduction  of  a  market  economy  combined  with
competition  from  ever-increasing  numbers  of  Han  placed  the  social  climate  under
strain. Local politicians, in thrall to Peking, are unable to challenge policies imposed
from the centre and often very strongly disliked (nuclear tests on the Lop Nor site, the
restriction of religious freedoms, the enforcement of birth control while colonists are
flooding  in…);  this  fact  has  provoked  numerous  protest  movements.  Faced  with  a
strained social and political climate, the local authorities (who cannot challenge the
policies dictated by Peking) have often reacted with brutality. They have sometimes
helped  to  give  an  insurrectional  twist  to  protest  movements  that,  originally,  were
merely directed against unpopular measures54.  While the disturbances became more
frequent55 in  response  to  excessive  Chinese  repression,  throughout  the  1990s  new
groupings appeared in Xinjiang and the Diaspora. In the Diaspora, most organisations
began to federate around the rejection of violent action while lobbying for the Uyghurs’
basic  rights  to  be  protected56;  by  contrast,  in  Xinjiang,  groups  with  a  sometimes
reduced life expectancy, but adopting more radical modes of action, appeared. They
protected themselves by keeping their memberships small, or withdrew from China (to
Central Asia, Afghanistan or Turkey). 
34 They carried out numerous guerrilla operations (sabotage57,  arson, attacks on police
barracks or military bases), and even graduated to acts of terrorism (assassinations of
Han officials or Uyghur collaborators, and bomb attacks). The increasing frequency of
acts of violence and terrorism in Xinjiang during the 1990s does not mean that all the
Uyghur  political  movements  support  these  modes  of  action.  But,  just  recently,  the
Chinese authorities have generally harped on about the frequency of acts of violence to
give the Uyghur opposition the image of a primarily terrorist force.
35 Only a short while ago, the Chinese government was opting to hush up the news of
these disturbances. However, following the events of September 11th 2001, it decided to
put out information about the more violent acts and the terrorist attacks carried out
during this period. It  attributed some of them to armed groups who, to date,  seem
mostly to have disappeared or become dormant58.  The Shock Brigade of the Islamic
Reformist Party are held responsible for the attack that, on the Chinese New Year in
February 1992, killed three people in a bus at Urumqi59. The East Turkistan Democratic
Islamic Party is held to have carried out the bomb attacks in the south of Xinjiang that
killed four victims between June and September 199360.  The most memorable crime,
that of February 25th 1997 in Urumqi (on the day of Deng Xiaoping’s funeral),  was
attributed to the East Turkistan National Unity Alliance. Four bombs had been planted
on different bus routes. The resulting explosions killed nine and wounded 74. On the
other hand, the Chinese regime did not mention in its report the crime committed
during the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress on March 7th 1997: the
bomb  went  off  in  a  bus  in  Peking’s  Xidan  district  (30  injured  and  two  dead).
Responsibility for this attack, the first to affect Peking since 1949, was claimed by the
Organisation  for  East  Turkistan  Freedom  (based  in  Turkey),  but  the  Chinese
government denied that any Uyghurs were involved in this attack. 
The spread of radical Islam in Xinjiang
36 At  the  same  time,  connections  have  apparently  been  made  between  some  Uyghur
militants  and  Islamic  movements.  This  phenomenon seems  to  be  linked  to  several
factors. On the one hand, the socio-political model promoted by these movements may
have seemed a preferable alternative to the Chinese model perceived as colonial and
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culturally invasive. The desire to establish a political and social order that would put
Uyghur Muslims at the centre of the system is very strong. Some Uyghur militants were
probably also influenced by the hope that by imposing a strict Islamic framework they
might at the same time find a solution to the present social problems. On the other
hand, bearing in mind the cessation of support (active or passive) from the USSR and
later of the Central Asian republics and taking account also of the indifference of the
West61, the vital necessity of finding foreign support over which Chinese diplomacy had
no hold also played an important role. Some Uyghur movements saw in the Islamic
card a means of playing on the solidarity existing between Muslims within the Umma to
attempt to win political support, fallback bases, even training facilities and funds to
further the struggle against Chinese power in Xinjiang.
37 The first links seem to have been made during the 1980s. During this period, many
foreigners  (traders,  preachers  62…)  profited  from the  relative  relaxation  of  Chinese
control to proselytise their causes in China itself63. At the same time, with the opening
of frontiers and the loosening of restrictions governing the Mecca pilgrimage, Uyghurs
travelling abroad came into contact with proselytising movements working in Pakistan,
Central Asia or in some Arab countries. Links were created in these cases too. At the
same  time  also,  as  the  restrictions  on  religious  education  in  Xinjiang  were  being
strengthened,  many  young  Uyghurs  went  abroad.  Through  connections  established
during the 1980s or through family links on the spot, these young people—and also
Uyghurs  in  the  Diaspora—took  religious  courses  in  the  Koranic  schools  sometimes
attached to Islamist movements.
38 Thus, in Kazakhstan it seems that some Uyghurs joined the Islamic Renaissance Party64.
In  Uzbekistan  and  in  Kirghizstan  some  of  them  joined  the  Islamic  Movement  of
Uzbekistan  (IMU)  or  else  Hizb-ut  Tahrir  (HT)65.  The  other  favoured  place  for
recruitment  was  Pakistan.  Chinese  researchers  suggest  that  about  ten  thousand
Uyghurs  went  to  Pakistan  to  receive  a  religious  education66.  This  figure  is  hard  to
verify. Nevertheless, some of them did indeed follow programmes in fundamentalist
Koranic  schools  in  Pakistan,  and  were  even  in  contact  with  various  local  Islamist
movements (Jamaat-e Islami67, Jamaat al-Tabligh 68…). Through these connections, some
Uyghurs took part in military operations. It seems that the Hizb ul-Mujahidin69 and the
Salafist  Jihadist70 movement  Lashkar-e  Taiba  in  particular 71 enrolled  a  handful  of
Uyghurs in the Kashmir conflict72. However, most of the Uyghurs involved in the Jihad
were in Afghanistan (mainly in the ranks of the Hizb-e Islami, the Taliban and later in
the  ranks  of  the  IMU).  Quoting  official  Russian  sources  and  Chinese  experts,  the
Chinese press has published figures ranging from over 200 Uyghurs in the “bin Laden
camps”  to  more  than  a  thousand  having  received  some  military  training  in
Afghanistan73. Again, the figures are difficult to check. However, after the fall of the
Taliban, the new Afghan government claims it has only a score of Chinese prisoners
(who it has promised to hand over to the Chinese authorities). So one may presume
that  the Uyghurs amount only to a  negligible  proportion of  the foreign supporters
fighting alongside local radical movements.
The Islamist faction in Xinjiang: a marginal threat but useful to the Chinese regime
39 During the 1990s, some of these young Uyghurs formed in their turn a small number of
Islamist  (or  Islamic nationalist)  groups which,  according to Peking,  have links with
Salafist  Jihadist  networks  based  in  the  region.  Because  we  have  little  reliable
information  about  these  ultra-clandestine  organisations,  it  is  very  difficult  to  be
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specific about their ideology. For the most part, they begin with a nucleus of Uyghurs
who have often received Islamic training abroad and are sometimes trained in combat
and the use of explosives; around them are grouped the militants they themselves have
recruited locally. However, the fact that they do not recruit from the Hui and that their
discourse  lays  greater  emphasis  on  liberating  East  Turkistan  than  on  creating  an
Islamic state (or on returning to a purified form of Islam) suggests that their agenda is
still mainly nationalist74.
40 Without having carried out a massive recruitment, these groups have concentrated on
enrolling young people from the urban working class, mainly from southern Xinjiang.
Admittedly, the substratum of urban youth, disconnected with Islam in its traditional
Sufi form75,  provides a reservoir of people that could feed the development of these
groups. However, although one may recently observe the growing power of the neo-
fundamentalist Hizb ut-Tahrir group76, the Islamist groups in Xinjiang have lost much
of  their  membership  and have  been officially  dismantled  by  the  Chinese  police.  In
reality, Chinese security focused its attention firstly on the East Turkistan Islamic Party
of Allah (whose name recalls Hezbollah). Founded in 1993 according to some sources
and in 1997 according to others77, the membership of this organisation campaigning for
the  creation  of  an  Islamic state  numbered  from  one  hundred  to  fifteen  hundred.
According to the Chinese authorities, its members attacked individuals associated with
the Chinese  government.  A  wave of  arrests  at  the  end of  the  1990s  seems to  have
uncovered  preparations  for  bombing  attacks.  In  the  end,  according  to  the  Chinese
press, the Party of Allah was dismantled a few years ago.
 
Table 4 : Differences in qualifications between Han and non-Han labour in Xinjiang in 1990
Source: Compilation based on data from the fourth census carried out in 1990 (Emily Hannum & Yu
Xie, op. cit., p. 329).
41 Yet, after the events of September 11th 2001, the marginal existence of this kind of
group was used by the Chinese regime to attempt to include the wholesale repression
of  the  Uyghur  opposition  within  the  international  dynamic  of  the  struggle  against
Islamist terrorist networks78.  While the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister declared in
November  2001  at  the  UN  that  “the  terrorist  forces  of  East  Turkistan  are  trained,
equipped and financed by international terrorist organisations”, in January 2002 the
State  Council  published  an  ambiguous  report  laying  stress  on  the  supposed  links
between al-Qaeda and the Uyghur opposition grouped under the falsely unifying label
of Dongtu79.  In fact, there is no structure that controls all the Uyghur movements in
Xinjiang  and  abroad;  and  the  vast  majority  of  them  have  no  connection,  either
ideological or organisational, with radical Islam. Yet, by stressing the supposed links of
the Party of Allah and the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) with al-Qaeda, this
report tends to lump together disparate elements of this kind. According to the thesis
proposed  by  the  State  Council,  members  of  these  groups  received  training  in
Afghanistan. The leaders of the ETIM (a group that until then was almost unknown) are
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alleged to have met bin Laden at the start of 1999 and in February 2001; and he is
alleged to have agreed to provide them with “fabulous sums”80. It is possible that these
movements, and particularly the ETIM, might have had contacts with the bin Laden
network  and  more  probably  with  the  Islamic  Movement  of  Uzbekistan81.  But  the
Chinese declarations that attempt to show particularly close relationships fly in the
face of bin Laden’s silence on East Turkistan.
42 For his part, the leader of the ETIM, Hasan Mahsum, assured Radio Free Asia on January
22nd 2002 that  his  ultimate aim was the liberation of  Xinjiang;  and he denied any
organic link with al-Qaeda.  Even so,  the Chinese lobbying did bear fruit.  It  enabled
China to persuade the US government, at the end of August 2002, and then the UN
Security  Council  to  include  on  the  list  of  groupings  linked  to  al-Qaeda  the  East
Turkistan Islamic Movement; it was given an extended description under a triple name:
the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, the East Turkistan Islamic Party of Allah and the
East Turkistan Islamic Party82. 
The Chinese regime and the Uyghur dilemma
43 The consequences of the policies pursued by the Chinese regime reveal the political
impasse  it  has  run  into  by  attacking  the  expressions  of  Uyghur  malaise  without
attacking its real causes. Mao Zedong, going back on his promises, quickly opted for
repression to put an end to demands for self-government, which had been made as
early as the 1950s. The Chinese regime then outlawed any kind of protest against the
policies imposed on Xinjiang; it also closed up most of the spaces in which the culture
and the religious convictions of  the Uyghurs could be expressed.  In this way it  fed
frustrations  that  were  also  exacerbated  by  colonisation  and  the  socio-economic
stratification that it led to. When, to reduce tension, the regime partially re-opened
these spaces, the re-opening simply allowed the power of Uyghur nationalism to grow.
And  since  Peking  closed  the  spaces  and  reverted  to  repression,  all  hopes  of  self-
government,  even  of  dialogue  with  the  Chinese  authorities,  have  flown  out  of  the
window.  Now  that  relations  have  completely  broken  down,  acts  of  violence  have
replaced peaceful demonstrations as the expression of the Uyghur malaise. Isolated as
they have been by skilful Chinese diplomacy, what remains of the Uyghur opposition in
Xinjiang is now open to all kinds of extremism.
NOTES
1. This study is based mainly on data gathered by the author since the end of the 1990s
in Xinjiang and within the Uyghur Diaspora.
2. Sharki Turkistan in Uyghur.
3. Historically, these communities shared the various ecological niches in the area. The
oases to the south of the Tianshan mountains, that is to say the oases of the Tarim,
Turfan and Kumul (Hami) Basins are traditionally populated by sedentary Uyghurs. The
Tianshan chain and the steppes to the north are home to the Kazakh and Kirghiz
nomads. To these Turkic-speaking populations are added the nomadic Mongols to the
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north and east, a Tajik community in the Pamirs and a few Uzbek and Tatar traders in
the large oases. Following the conquest of the region by the Qing, Han, Manchurian
population demobilised or sent there to ensure control of the north of the province,
and Chinese Muslims (Hui) came to settle.
4. These Turkic-speaking populations have in common to be Sunni muslims of the
Hanafi rite and to practise an Islam influenced by Sufism. Only the Tajiks of the Chinese
Pamirs depart from this rule. They are Iranian-speaking, and are part of the Ismaelian
branch of Shiism.
5. Until the twentieth century, these populations, fragmented by differences of identity
and by political and religious rivalries between oases, referred to their geographic
origin (their oasis of origin) to identify themselves. The term Uyghur refers to the
Turkic people who, in the Middle Ages, developed a brilliant civilisation in the east of
Xinjiang. This ethnonym, having disappeared since Islamisation, was revived by
Russian ethnologists; it was brought back into service during the 1930s by Soviet
advisors of Sheng Shicai to designate the Turkic-speaking sedentary Muslim
communities speaking the Turki dialect of the Xinjiang oases. See Dru Gladney, “The
Ethnogenesis of the Uighur”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1990, pp. 1-28;
Abdurahman Abdullah, Tashkentchilair (Those who have studied in Tashkent), Xinjiang
Renmin chubanshe, 2002.
6. Pan-Turkism, which was partly confused with Jadidism in Central Asia, developed in
the 1880s among the Tatars of Russia. This reform movement aimed to restore political
influence to the Muslim Turkish peoples and to awaken their national consciousness by
modernising them (educational reforms, theological reforms…) Though it cannot be on
the scale of the Turkish world as a whole, Pan-Turkism, closely mingled with Uyghur
nationalism, helps to unite the various Turkic-speaking populations of East Turkistan
behind the same political project.
7. Masami Hamada, “La transmission du mouvement nationaliste au Turkestan oriental
(Xinjiang)”, Central Asian Survey, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1990, pp. 29-48; Justin Rudelson , Oasis
Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China’s Silk Road, New York, Columbia University
Press, 1997, pp. 55-57.
8. Andrew D. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, A Political History of
Republican Xinjiang 1911-1949, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 63-121.
9. Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang,
1944-1949, New York, Armonk, Sharpe, 1990; David Wang, Under the Soviet Shadow: The
Yining Incident; Ethnic Conflicts and International Rivalry in Xinjiang, 1944-1949, Hong Kong,
Chinese University Press, 1999.
10. Barry Sautman, “Preferential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: the Case of
Xinjiang”, Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities, Vol. 4, No. 1/2, spring/summer 1998,
pp. 86-113.
11. This colonisation policy, for example, has just been openly encouraged anew by the
Permanent Committee of the Politburo of the CCP on March 19th 1996: its confidential
session was devoted to maintaining stability in Xinjiang (“Guanyu weihu Xinjiang
wending de huiyi jiyao, zhongyang zhengzhiju weiyuanhui” An English version of this
text has been published by Human Rights Watch).
12. James D. Seymour, “Xinjiang’s Production and Construction Corps and the
Sinification of Eastern Turkestan”, Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000, pp. 171-94; Nicolas
Becquelin, “Chinese hold on Xinjiang: Strengths and Limits”, in François Godement ed., 
La Chine et son Occident. China and its Western Frontier, Les Cahiers de l’Asie, IFRI, Paris,
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2002, pp. 62-66; Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan tongji nianjian, (Statistical Yearbook
of the Production and Construction Corps in Xinjiang), Peking, Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 1999.
13. It is hard to calculate the real number of Han living in Xinjiang because the Chinese
authorities, in their statistics, only declare communities under the jurisdiction of
regional authorities and not those under the jurisdiction of the central authorities.
14. By Islamism, we shall understand any movement led by intellectuals benefiting
from a modern education whose aim is “to build, starting with the power of the state, a
global political system which would manage all aspects of the society and the economy,
founding its authority only on Islam and rejecting any political pluralism”, (Olivier Roy,
Généalogie de l’islamisme, Hachette, Paris, 2002, p. 10).
15. Bearing in mind the structural deficit of the autonomous region’s finances (about
50% of the regional budget at the end of the 1990s), Xinjiang is mainly dependant on
funding from central government (see Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the nineties”, 
China Journal, No. 44, July 2000, pp. 71-74).
16. In January 2000, Peking launched the campaign it called “Opening up the Great
West” (Xibu dakaifa) in order to reduce the development gap between the East and the
West of China. It aims in particular to encourage investment in the whole area made up
of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the Autonomous Regions of Tibet, of
Ningxia, of Guangxi, of Inner Mongolia, the provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, Shaanxi,
Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and the municipality of Chongqing. Although the
effectiveness of the proposed measures is doubtful, the Xinjiang authorities refer
frequently to them to assure the autochthonous populations that they have not been
abandoned and that all measures are being taken to improve their living conditions. On
the campaign and what is at stake, see David S. G. Goodman, “The politics of the West:
equality, nation-building and colonisation”, in La Chine et son Occident. China and its
Western Frontier, IFRI, Les Cahiers d’Asie, Paris, 2001, pp. 23-55.
17. 2002 Zhongguo tongji nianjian (Statistical Yearbook of China), Peking, Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe, 2002, p. 51.
18. The main pioneer areas were opened up along the Hami-Turfan-Urumqi-Changji-
Shihezi line, and along a line pushing out westwards (Yanji-Korla-Luntai-Aksu...).
Extending the transport infrastructures mainly favoured colonisation by making zones
that were formerly remote more accessible to the colonists. In the 1950s, only Kumul
(Hami) was linked to the rest of the Chinese railway network. Urumqi was linked up in
1960. The Turfan-Korla section was completed in 1984, connecting Urumqi to the
Kazakh frontier was achieved in the early 1990s and the Korla-Aksu-Kashgar section in
1999. The cross-desert road linking Khotan to Korla was finished in 1995. Thus, since
the north of the Tarim Basin was given its rail link to the Chinese network and since
Khotan was linked by road to the north of the Tarim Basin, the historical centres of
Uyghur population, once isolated, have been receiving a steady influx of colonists.
19. The threshold set by the international organisations is about a dollar per day (that
is, about 3,000 yuan per year).
20. In Xinjiang, bearing in mind the omnipresence of putonghua in the administration
and the economy, it is essential to master it in order to rise to posts of responsibility.
Young Uyghur pupils have a choice between attending “Uyghur classes” where
teaching is conducted mainly in Uyghur and “Chinese classes” where teaching is
conducted in Mandarin (Chinese). The Uyghur elite (often mastering Mandarin by
themselves) frequently send their children to the Chinese classes to ensure for them
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better chances of professional success. However, bearing in mind the risks of losing
one’s own culture that this choice incurs for some people, bearing in mind the fairly
strict compartmentalisation of Han and Uyghur housing, and also because in the
remote rural Uyghur areas these Chinese classes are not available, most Uyghur
families send their children to the “Uyghur classes” near where they live. Thus, many
young people, despite the existence of Chinese lessons and classes taught in Chinese in
the “Uyghur classes”, do not master Chinese by the time they leave.
21. The continuous influx of the Han produces on the labour market significant
tensions that are aggravated by the fact that the economy is dominated by the Han.
Since Han people prefer to be surrounded by Han people, the jobs that they create go to
them and not to the Uyghurs. This “preferential job recruitment” is mainly observable
in the private sector where there is no encouragement for employers to recruit from
the national minorities. Many Uyghurs speak resentfully of this kind of discrimination
in the labour market and complain that, with equal or superior skills, they cannot
compete with the Han or the Hui (Interviews, Xinjiang, 1999-2002).
22. Emily Hannum and Yu Xie, “Ethnic stratification in Northwest China: occupational
differences between Han Chinese and national minorities in Xinjiang, 1982-1990”, 
Demography, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1998, p. 328.
23. See Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National
Development, 1536-1966, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975. Whether Xinjiang
fulfils the half-dozen criteria that qualify a territory as an interior colony is the subject
of much debate. However, in our opinion, whether the peripheral community considers
itself to be colonised is more important than validating these criteria, when it comes to
understanding how these situations of stratification (perceived or real) can lead to
ethnic nationalism.
24. Interviews, 1999-2002. See for example, East Turkistan Information Center (ETIC),
“Sherqiy Turkistanda Bashbalasi Hitay Koçmenliri” (The Chinese Migrants in East
Turkistan), www.uygur.org.
25. Interviews, Xinjiang, 1999-2002.
26. Ibid.
27. Cf note 22.
28. Colin Mackerras, “Xinjiang and the causes of separatism”, Central Asian Survey,
Vol. 20, No. 3, 2001, p. 290.
29. See Elizabeth Allès, Leïla Chérif-Chebbi & Constance-Hélène Halfon, “L’islam
chinois, unité et fragmentation”, Archives de sciences sociales des religions, n° 115, 2001,
pp. 15-47.
30. On religious education in China, see Elisabeth Allès, “Muslim Religious Education in
China”, China Perspectives, No. 45, January-February 2003, pp. 21-29. 
31. As Pierre Bourdieu has underlined in his analysis of the relationship between the 
habitus and class conflicts, the habitus is governed by relational influences. Above all, it
is public, in that it is meant to carry meaning in other people’s eyes. In this regard, the
study of the evolution of the Uyghur habitus gives us extensive information on the
nature of the relations between the Uyghurs and the Chinese centre.
32. Artoush Kumul, “Le séparatisme ouïghour au XXe siècle”, CEMOTI, n° 25, January-
June 1998, p. 88.
33. Zhang Yumo, “The Anti-Separatism Struggle and its Historical Lessons since the
Liberation of Xinjiang” in Yang Faren et al., Fanyisilanzhuyi, fantujuezhuyi yanjiu (Study
on Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism), 1994, a document translated and published in
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English on the web site of the Uyghur American Association, 
www.uyghuramerican.org/researchanalysis/trans.html.
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